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From landing to arrival

The subtle integration of immigrants across Western Europe
The European Social Survey (ESS)

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples.

The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. The main aims of the ESS are:

- to chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe, and to interpret how Europe’s social, political and moral fabric is changing;
- to achieve and spread higher standards of rigour in cross-national research in the social sciences, including for example, questionnaire design and pre-testing, sampling, data collection, reduction of bias and the reliability of questions;
- to introduce soundly-based indicators of national progress, based on citizens’ perceptions and judgements of key aspects of their societies;
- to undertake and facilitate the training of European social researchers in comparative quantitative measurement and analysis;
- to improve the visibility and outreach of data on social change among academics, policy makers and the wider public.

The ESS data is available free of charge for non-commercial use.

In 2005 the ESS was the winner of the Descartes Prize for Research & Science Communication.

Following an application to the European Commission which was submitted by the UK on behalf of 14 other countries, the ESS was awarded European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) status on 30th November 2013. As of today, ESS is one of the largest Research Infrastructure in Europe with 25 members.
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS

- Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), the report analyses the process of the subtle integration of immigrants in 13 countries of Western Europe, comparing characteristics, such as values, attitudes and cultural norms, across host countries and regions of origin, and considering time spent in the country since arrival.

- Immigrants differ from the host societies’ local population in terms of their attitudes and set of values. In general, they have a more positive attitude and higher levels of trust in the major societal, economic and political institutions of the country, but they feel more excluded from society than do locals and are somewhat less attached emotionally to the country. In general, they value tradition and security – but also personal achievement and humanitarian values – more.

- There are significant differences in terms of country of destination and country of origin. Attitude toward institutions seems to be more dependent on where the immigrants have settled, while the perception of inclusion in the new environment seems to hinge more on the region of origin (or visibility of migrant origin).

- By analysing numerous aspects of the subtle integration of immigrants in Western European societies, we reveal a very clear and unequivocal trend of acculturation and convergence of immigrants’ attitudes with those of the host society. This convergence takes place in all immigrant groups, in all destination countries and on all aspects of the analysis. However, the speed of convergence is not the same in all destination countries, and it seems that migrants of colour arriving from poorer regions take significantly longer to adapt to the new environment.

- Convergence with the host society continues beyond the first generation: second-generation migrants’ values and attitudes are very similar to those of the natives in the host society, but in some countries they still differ for some origin groups. Except for in Spain, second-generation immigrants’ attitudes toward, and trust in, institutions are very similar to those of the native population. However, the perception of exclusion remains significant in the Netherlands and the UK: in those two countries, there is almost no difference between how included the first and the second generations feel. It may be a source of social tension if many of those who were born and raised in the country, and who identify with it, feel excluded and discriminated against.

- The process of acculturation is also very explicit in all countries: the vast majority of immigrants adopt the language of the host country in private situations after a certain period of residence, and come to feel more integrated. The majority also adopts the values and cultural norms of the host society, such as tolerance of minorities. However, the pace of this process varies significantly across host countries and regions of origin.

- The complex model, which takes into account all the significant factors that are likely to influence the process of acculturation and convergence with mainstream values and attitudes shows that region of origin, Muslim religion, time spent in the country and labour market status all matter. The level of perceived discrimination is above average among immigrants from Sub-Saharan African, Middle Eastern and North African countries, Muslims, recent immigrants, and those on the periphery of the labour market.
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1 INTRODUCTION

According to the media and politicians, one of the most significant challenges facing European societies since the mid-2010s has been migration and the integration of newcomers into European societies. There is nothing new about transnational migration: European countries have experienced various waves of migration in their historical and recent past. These waves have had different triggers, and thus the challenges of integrating the immigrants have also been varied. The most recent wave relates to refugees fleeing war or post-war political and social insecurity, or areas where climate change is already a painful reality. There has been geographical mobility throughout human history: people moved to places where they hoped for a better life, with greater security, a better job, better health, etc. In recent decades, however, the opportunities for mobility have improved significantly, thanks to information technology and the internet, with the associated virtually unlimited flow of information on where, how and when migration pays off for individuals. Human mobility is also fed by the needs of the global economy: global corporate-sector firms are more flexible than ever about hiring a workforce to help them develop their production and services.

However, as human mobility has speeded up, and as the share of immigrants in most of Europe’s countries has increased, so the integration of newcomers has become increasingly challenging. Some countries have seen the proportion of new immigrants rise to several per cent of their population within just a few years. But the integration of people from different cultural, religious and language backgrounds is perceived by many Europeans to be a burden – and even a threat.

In our previous studies, we analysed the attitudes of the local population to immigrants, and explored cross-national differences in people’s perceptions of migration (Messing and Ságvári, 2018; 2019). We investigated those factors that may underlie the immense differences in the acceptance or rejection of immigrants across European countries, and we painted a bigger picture to show the changes in attitudes in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2016/17. We also looked at how attitudes changed from before the 2015 migration ‘crisis’ to after it, and at how anti-immigrant attitudes are linked to extremism and populism. The most important finding of our research was that ‘over a period of 16 years … the overall perception of migration, as well as the share of those supporting the explicit rejection of migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe, have not changed radically’ (Messing and Ságvári, 2019).

Our analysis of the triggers of extreme negative attitudes concluded that lack of contact with immigrants and the degree to which the dominant norms are set by mainstream politics both matter in terms of transforming aversion into extreme rejection. This may explain why anti-migrant attitudes are strongest in countries that are least exposed to migration: in general, these are the countries where anti-migrant populist political forces can gain the most traction by stoking fears about migration.

In this report, we offer a different angle on the same subject: we look at how immigrants adapt to their new environment. Generally, research on immigrants’ integration focuses on those socioeconomic characteristics that are a prerequisite for ensuring that immigrants gain a foothold in their new environment. While objective measures of socioeconomic integration – such as employment, education, housing and income – are very important signals of adaptation to the new environment and represent a structural part
of the challenge of integration, there is a subjective side to this challenge: namely, the way in which the changing attitudes and values of immigrants converge with the attitudes and values of the natives in the host country. Hall and du Gay (1996) suggests that integration is happening gradually and subtly in small communities at the grassroots level though everyday practices that bring about a gradual change of attitudes, values and identities. Our current analysis focuses on this subjective side of integration, which will be referred to as subtle integration.

The European Social Survey (ESS) provides an excellent source for studying immigrants’ integration at the level of norms and attitudes. The following characteristics of ESS make this survey suitable for investigating the above questions. First, every second year since 2002, this survey of the population of participating countries has investigated the values, political and public attitudes of people. ESS covers the entire population of a country aged 15 and over, including those people who are not citizens, but who are legally resident in that country. Secondly, the survey provides data on the country of birth and on the time since arrival in the receiving country. Thirdly, by combining the eight rounds of data available, we have sufficient cases to allow an analysis of immigrants and their subgroups, as well as to compare immigrants in various host countries. Using the definition of immigrant based on country of birth, 9.2% of all respondents (34,600) were born in a country that was different from that in which they lived at the time of the survey. Due to the vagueness of what a ‘different’ country of birth means in the context of East and South East Europe, as well as the low share of those born in a different country (1–3% in this region), we decided to focus only on immigrants in Western Europe. For methodological reasons, we also decided to include the data only of countries that have participated in at least seven of the eight rounds of the ESS survey.¹ The foreign-born population in the 13 countries that remained in our sample after the selection described above is still numerous enough (9.8% of the total 202,705: that is, 19,884 individuals in 13 countries) to allow an in-depth analysis of the values, attitudes and norms of immigrants and their subgroups.

Although this report was drafted prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, we cannot turn a blind eye to the unprecedented situation we are experiencing in 2020. Although we have as yet little idea how long the pandemic will last, or how profound its social, economic and political consequences will be, one thing is certain: it will alter the opportunities and conditions for human mobility in Europe for a long time to come, as well as the potentials and circumstances surrounding migrant integration into European societies. Countries have closed their borders; many immigrants – more typically from within the EU – have returned to their home countries to await the lifting of the lock-down; while receiving countries are struggling with the lack of labour previously provided by immigrants, prior to the closure of the borders. The lock-down will be lifted, but probably only in a limited way. It is likely that for a long time to come, humans will not be as free as before to exercise their right to mobility. Thus, we need to stress that this report refers to pre-pandemic circumstances and is based on data collected well before the virus changed our lives.

¹ There are 13 countries which fulfil the above conditions: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, Finland, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The novelty of our study is that, rather than structural traits of the social integration of immigrants (such as labour market position, level of education, social status, etc.), it looks at social integration at the level of attitudes and values, and does so in a complex way. Studies have shown that migration matters in terms of structural conditions and opportunities for immigrants. The development paths of migrants diverge from those of the population in the country of origin (de Haas, 2005), and the economic and social status of immigrants undergoes significant change (Harris and Todaro, 1970; van Meeteren et al., 2009). Other research discusses spheres of integration, such as employment, education or housing. A significantly smaller part of the research into immigrants’ integration focuses on more subjective characteristics underlying integration, such as the perception of inclusion in and adaptation to the attitudes and values characterizing the population of the host society. Some of the earlier research approached migrant integration by analysing changes in norms and attitudes, but these studies focused on only one or another type of value or attitude. For example, Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) and Dinesen (2012) studied the adaptation of first- and second-generation immigrants through the level of trust they developed toward state institutions and other people (i.e. institutional and generalized trust). They presumed that the level of trust among second-generation immigrants converges toward the level that characterizes the host country’s general population; this can be viewed as an indicator of immigrants’ integration. Another strand of research investigated political attitudes. Careja and Emmenegger (2012) examined the effects of migration experience on political attitudes in Central and Eastern European countries. They looked at people returning from Western countries to Central and Eastern Europe and examined whether they displayed different political attitudes from their fellow, non-migrant, citizens. They considered whether migrants who return from democracies to a country with only brief (or no) experience of democracy bring about a change in political outlook, reflecting the process of attitudinal change in a new environment. The same research idea is followed by Fitzgerald et al. (2014), who analysed the attitudes of migrants moving from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. They took attitudes toward gay and lesbian people as a case for acculturation, and found evidence of its existence: attitudes toward sexual minorities became more tolerant, the longer immigrants were resident in Western Europe. Yet another strand of research, mainly qualitative, investigates how social contacts and connectedness change after migration, and how people cope with the new social environment in terms of personal relations. For example, a quantitative study by Bartram (2019) compares migrants’ social ties with those of ‘stayers’ in the countries that the migrants left. Social contacts and supporting ties are an especially important signifier of social inclusion into society (Granovetter, 1977).

2.1 Three aspects underlying the process of subtle integration

Our study follows this line of thought, but expands on the research into the transformation of perceptions and attitudes. There are three perspectives from which we look at the process of subtle integration in this study: (1) institutional attitude convergence, (2) perceived integration and (3) acculturation. Institutional attitude convergence refers to the extent to which immigrants adopt the approaches of people in the host countries toward institutions. Institutions play a key role in a society’s functioning and may vary considerably.
from one national environment to another. Attitudes toward institutions and the norms surrounding them differ among immigrants arriving from countries where institutions may have different roles, prestige and acceptance. These are expressed through satisfaction with the macro institutions of a society, such as its economy, government and its main ruling principle (democracy), as well as by the degree to which the institutions are trusted. We presume that immigrants adopt natives’ institutional attitudes over time.

The second aspect used in this study is the perception of being integrated – of being admitted to the host society at an individual level. We believe that there is a personal level to integration and that this shows up as immigrants feeling that they are accepted by the host environment, rather than being viewed as an ‘other’. This perception has a number of elements, such as building social contacts with locals, having friends, feeling valued and not feeling discriminated against because of one’s origins. We will be able to use this final element – the perception of not being discriminated against – as a proxy for perceived integration into the local society.

The third aspect to be used in this study is acculturation, which refers to the process by which individuals who move from one cultural context to another develop new patterns of attitudes, behaviours and identities that are shaped by the dominant norms of the new cultural context. Within this process, attitudes, behaviour and even one’s identity may be modified by experiences in the new context and the new environment offered by the new host or destination culture. This is a lengthy and continuous process, and is described by Ryder and colleagues as follows: ‘When an individual moves from one culture to another, many aspects of self-identity are modified to accommodate information about and experiences within the new culture. This process, generally referred to as acculturation, involves changes that take place as a result of continuous and direct contact between individuals having different cultural origin’ (Ryder et al., 2000: 49).

In this paper we look at acculturation – i.e. the extent to which identity, values and beliefs are influenced by mobility and a new cultural environment – from several perspectives: primary language used at home; emotional attachment to the host country; and attitudes toward homosexuality. This last factor is treated as a proxy for acculturation. Attitudes toward homosexuality are deeply rooted in culture and religion. In part, the more tolerant attitudes toward gay and lesbian people in Western Europe are likely to reflect such values as tolerance and acceptance, which are at the core of European values. Therefore, we suggest, this is a valuable indicator of accommodation to new cultural norms – of acculturation.

2.2 Basic indicators

We developed three indicators representing subjective (and profound) integration. The first relates to the assessment of the major institutions of society. This is a robust indicator, comprising several individual items: it is based on the overall level of satisfaction with the economy, education, health care, government and democracy; and the level of trust in parliament, political parties, politicians, the legal system and the police. We refer to this indicator as the Institutional Attitude Index (IAI); it uses a scale of 1 to 100, where higher scores reflect greater trust in, and satisfaction with, the major societal, political and economic institutions of the state.
The second indicator reflects how immigrants feel in the new society: whether they feel discriminated against, based on any ‘visible’ or ‘non-visible’ element of their migrant origins (i.e. race, nationality, language, etc.). Throughout the report, this dichotomous indicator will be referred to as the Perceived Exclusion Index (PEI) and it represents the share of those who feel discriminated against, based on any trait that relates to their migrant background.

Finally, the process of acculturation will be measured by three independent variables: language used at home (as a first language), emotional attachment to the host country and attitudes toward homosexuality. The first two variables are quite evident: using the host country’s language in private life situations is a very advanced level of adoption of the host society’s culture. Emotional identification is also a good indication of acculturation. Both will be measured by dummy variables (including only two categories): whether or not the individual uses the language of the host country as a first language at home; and whether the individual has a markedly positive emotional attachment to the host country or has negative feelings about it. A person’s attitude toward the gay and lesbian community is regarded as a proxy for acculturation, as it reflects the basic Western European norm of tolerance. We grouped people into two categories: tolerant and non-tolerant, based on how much they support the idea that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish. In our analysis, we focus on those who are tolerant in their attitudes. The composition of the three indicators is summarized in Figure 1.

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\[2\] This question has been asked only since the eighth round of the ESS (2016/17); therefore, the sample of immigrants is rather small and does not allow for analysis including more than two aspects. Still we will present this very simple analysis, as it is a perfect measure of acculturation.
2.3 Conceptualization of immigrants

Another issue that needs to be addressed in this section is the conceptualization of the category of immigrant. Migration is a very complex phenomenon, involving a large variety of categories. Although the term ‘migrant’ is well defined in legal and policy contexts, still it is used in many senses, especially in non-scholarly public discourse. When talking about migrants, people may be thinking about significantly different groups of people: some may be thinking of labour migrants working in the service sector or in factories; others may be visualizing second- or third-generation youth in the marginalized neighbourhoods of large metropolitan areas; a third group may be picturing refugees fleeing the war in Syria; and yet others may be thinking of Africans trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea in dinghies.

In this study, we use a widely recognized conceptualization of the migrant category: those whose country of birth was different from where they live at present (or – in practical terms – different from the country where they were interviewed). This is the most transparent and most frequently used conceptualization of the category – even though, in rare cases, it may mean that the individual does not actually have a migrant background or identity at all (e.g. people born in a foreign country while their parents were merely visiting that country for a short while). This definition also disregards migrant ancestry: namely those who, although they were born in the country where they live, have parents of foreign descent (second-generation migrants). It also disregards important elements of identity making, namely language use or identification with an ethnic group. The exception to the use of this concept of the migrant is section 3.4, which explicitly compares first- and second-generation migrants. Here, we conceptualize a second-generation migrant as someone whose mother and father were both born outside Europe. However, being born in a different country may have an utterly different meaning in post-communist countries and in old EU member states: state boundaries have changed in Central and Eastern Europe over the past 30 years (just think of the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the USSR or Yugoslavia). For this reason, the present study will focus only on immigrants in 13 European countries: 11 of the old EU member states, plus Norway and Switzerland. Purely for the sake of simplicity, henceforth we refer to this country group as ‘old EU/EAA member states’.

Even if we limit our focus to these 13 countries, immigrants comprise a very heterogeneous population in terms of their origin, cultural heritage, religion and years since their migration occurred – that is, in terms of the traits that are essential for social integration. We had to come up with some way of managing such diversity, without fragmenting our analysis so far as to end up with groups consisting of just a handful of people. Thus, we constructed two categories for the country of origin:

1. For the general picture, we use a simple category of EU member state and third-country nationals (TCN, otherwise known as non-EU migrants).
2. For a more detailed categorization, reflecting the role of origin, we use the following (admittedly imperfect) groupings: (1) old EU/EEA member states, plus Switzerland (EU/EEA mobile), (2) countries with post-communist heritage (including those countries that are EU member states, having joined the EU after 2004, and those that are not presently EU member states – i.e. countries in the Balkans and ex-Soviet countries); (3) countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and North African countries); (4) Sub-Saharan Africa; (5) South and East Asia (including India, China and the Indochinese Peninsula); (6) Latin America.
We have disregarded immigrants arriving from the Pacific, North America and Israel, as these are very small groups and are hard to include in any of the above categories (Figure 2).

FIGURE 2. TWO APPROACHES FOR CONCEPTUALIZING COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Categorization by legal terms

EU/EEA mobile immigrants (including Switzerland)

TCN immigrants

Categorization by regions of cultural/religious heritage

Old EU member states

Post-communist and ex-USSR (including New EU member states and Post-Soviet countries)

Middle East and North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

South and East Asia

Latin America
2.4 Research design and structure of the report

The study will first discuss the methods of the research and the data we use. We then present four types of analysis. The first describes the most important characteristics of immigrants’ attitudes, values and norms (section 3.1) and looks at three spheres of subjective integration detailed above in 13 countries. This part of the analysis provides an insight into how – and which – groups of immigrants differ from the mainstream population.

In the next analytical section (3.2) we paint a more dynamic picture, showing how the characteristics representing integration are influenced by the length of time spent in the host country. We show that – in most respects and in most countries – there is an explicit and steady process of convergence toward mainstream attitudes and values.

The third type of analysis (section 3.3) offers a case study that zooms in on three specific groups – Turkish, Russian and Polish immigrants – and compares the indicators of integration in those groups with the indicators of their compatriots who stayed at home. This analysis allows us to see how immigration has impacted the attitudes and values of people of the same national origin, depending on whether they emigrated or stayed in the country of their birth. The reason behind the use of data from these countries is that they are all major suppliers of immigrants to Western Europe. Also, they participated in several (or all eight, in the case of Poland) ESS rounds, and so we are able to statistically compare immigrants with the local population at the origin and the destination.

Section 3.4 focuses on differences between first- and second-generation migrants. In this analysis, we work on the hypothesis that social integration and acculturation take place over the longer term, and that the attitudes and norms of second-generation immigrants – those who were born, raised and schooled in the host country – are more closely aligned with those of the mainstream population than are the attitudes and norms of the first generation. However, this is not evident: part of the research shows that it is actually the second generation that may become more alienated from the host society. While the first generation is ambitious, resilient and willing to adapt to the new environment and to experience the advantages of migration (they may compare their situation pre- and post-migration), the second generation may have a sense of greater alienation: they may feel they belong to and identify with the society in which they were raised and in which they live, but they may also feel that they face more discrimination, social exclusion and economic hardship than their peers.

Section 3.5 presents a multivariate analysis of factors that may explain the convergence of institutional attitudes, perceived integration and acculturation: that is, the process of subtle integration. Here we take into account the role of the most important demographic characteristics (age, gender, level of education), the region of origin and the country of immigration, time spent in the host country, religion and labour market status, and we show how these influence the overall potential for profound integration.

The report ends with a summary of the main findings.
2.5 Data and methods

In the analysis, we used data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey (Round 1 in 2002 to Round 8 in 2016/17). The aggregated dataset included all survey rounds and all the countries that participated in at least seven of the eight survey rounds. The category of ‘immigrant’ was operationalized through country of birth: immigrants were considered to be those whose country of birth was different from the country where they lived. The study included 13 European countries: Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Altogether, the aggregated dataset included 202,705 respondents, of whom 19,884 (9.6%) were born in a different country and were thus considered immigrants. Within the immigrant subgroup, 40% were born in another EU/EEA member state (and are thus considered EU/EEA mobile), and 60% (11,765) were third-country nationals (TCN). As for their origins, after those born in another EU/EEA member state, the largest segment of immigrants (in the ESS survey) came from countries in the Middle East and North Africa (26% of TCN immigrants), from the post-Soviet region (23% of TCN migrants), from Latin America (18% of TCN migrants) and from Sub-Saharan Africa and South and East Asia (16% of TCN migrants apiece).

The following chart shows the distribution of EU mobile and TCN migrants in the ESS aggregated dataset.

FIGURE 3. SHARE OF EU/EEA ORIGIN AND NON-EU ORIGIN (TCN) IMMIGRANTS

The share of the immigrant population in the ESS survey ranges from 3% to 22%; but discounting the two extremes of Finland and Switzerland, their share is generally 8–12%. There are, however, significant differences in terms of the share of EU and non-EU immigrants. In Ireland, Switzerland and Austria, EU/EEA mobile people dominate the immigrants, whereas in Portugal, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain and France, over a third of immigrants come from non-EU countries. This poses different challenges of integration for countries and their populations.
As for the region of origin, there is no great surprise: in Germany and Finland – in addition to EU/EEA mobile people – there is a preponderance of immigrants from the post-Soviet region. In Spain, immigrants of Latin American descent predominate, while in Portugal the primary source of immigration is Sub-Saharan Africa. Immigrants in the UK, France, Norway and Sweden are very diverse in terms of their origins. The most interesting finding is that the share of people arriving in Europe from the wider Middle East and North Africa is relatively small (0–18%), even though media coverage of immigration is dominated by news and images of this group.

The available statistics on the actual share of the immigrant population in European member states do not completely tally with the actual share and composition of immigrants measured by the ESS: the overall share of immigrants is underestimated in the ESS. Since our focus is on soft factors, rather than hard figures, we do not regard this as a major problem. In order to ensure an adequate number of respondents for the migrant subcategories, we had to make some tough decisions on aggregating certain groups.3 We are aware of the limitations of such an approach; however, we had to find a compromise here. It needs to be stressed that the ESS data are not representative of the migrant population in terms of their population shares (Figure 4). We work on the hypothesis that even though the ESS found proportionally fewer immigrants than are present in the population, this does not bias the subsample, and so it is suitable for mapping the major processes of immigrant subtle integration.

3 For example, post-communist Central and Eastern European countries with ex-USSR member states; or treating Asian descent as one homogenized category.
3 IMMIGRANTS’ SUBTLE INTEGRATION: THE LONG ROAD OF ADAPTATION

3.1 How do immigrants differ from the host/local societies?

In this section, we describe immigrants’ subjective attributes relevant to subtle integration, and compare them to those of the native population of the host country; we also compare groups of immigrants of different origin. The big picture is that, in terms of most of the elements of subtle integration, immigrants perform differently from locals. This difference varies across both countries of destination and regions of origin; thus, both origin and host country matter in terms of the extent to which immigrants adapt to host societies.

The composite indicator of the Institutional Attitude Index (IAI), which measures several elements of attitudes toward, and evaluation of, the institutions of the host society, shows interesting differences both between various groups of immigrants and also across countries. The big picture (based on 13 countries) is that immigrants’ attitudes and their evaluation of the host countries’ institutions are generally somewhat more positive (56, on a scale of 0–100) than are those of natives (51).

There are significant differences between countries, however, and it would seem that the extent to which immigrants are satisfied with, and have trust in, the institutions depends greatly on the attitudes typical of the non-immigrant mainstream population (Figure 5).

![Figure 5: Institutional Attitude Index (IAI) by destination country and region of origin](image-url)
In countries with a generally high level of trust in (and satisfaction with) institutions, immigrants tend to be even more positive (Switzerland, Finland, Sweden and Norway); meanwhile, in countries with relatively low trust in (and satisfaction with) institutions (such as Portugal, Spain and France), immigrants also have lower IAI. Still, it is noteworthy that immigrants in all countries are more trusting and better satisfied with institutions than are the locals, and that immigrants from third countries have a higher IAI than EU/EEA mobile people.

To look at how immigrants perceive their own social inclusion, we constructed the Perceived Exclusion Index (PEI), which is actually the measure of feeling that one is discriminated against based on one’s origins. We assumed that the perception of being discriminated against not only represents the level of actual discrimination, but also reflects an individual’s sense (or lack thereof) of being integrated into the host country and local society. The following chart shows PEI by country of destination and region of origin.

The data show that, as we expected, immigrants report significantly higher levels of perceived discrimination than locals, and there is a great difference between immigrants who are visibly different from the local population and immigrants who are not. Based on this measure, we see that those who are internally mobile in the EU/EEA (and most likely not visibly different from local populations) feel more included. Immigrants of Middle Eastern and African descent feel the most discrimination, and thus the greatest barriers to genuine inclusion in their immediate social environment. In this respect, there are also significant differences in terms of destination country: immigrants in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands feel the highest levels of discrimination, whereas in countries where the population has a more positive attitude
toward immigrants (such as Norway, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland), immigrants feel a higher level of personal inclusion (see Messing and Ságvári, 2019).

As for the third aspect of the analysis of subtle integration – acculturation – we use several proxies. The first is the language used at home: whether people with an immigrant background use the language of the host country or speak in the language of their origins. Figure 7 indicates this aspect.

There are significant differences in use of the host society’s language, in terms of both the country of destination and the region of origin. We see that EU/EEA mobile people, immigrants from Latin America and people from countries in the Middle East and North Africa are likely to speak the language of their host country at home. But this is less a sign of acculturation than of the fact that their native language and the language of the host country are more likely to overlap (Spanish, French, Portuguese).

We see that TCN immigrants in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden are the least likely to adopt the language of the host society in their private lives, and approximately half of TCN migrants speak the language of the host country in Belgium, Germany and Norway. It is interesting that in the UK and Ireland, a third of TCN migrants do not speak English at home; meanwhile, as a country with a non-global language, the Netherlands seems to be the most successful in the linguistic integration of immigrants. In France, Portugal and Spain, the language integration of immigrants is less of an issue, as most of them arrive from ex-colonial territories, where the host country’s language is still an official language – or is at least part of the school curriculum.
Another measure of the acculturation process is that of emotional attachment to the host country: a sign of the local cultural and social environment becoming part of an individual’s identity. The following chart shows the share of those who feel a strong attachment to the country they live in (giving 9 or 10 on a scale of 0–10), for locals, EU/EEA mobile and TCN immigrants.

We see that the host environment matters more than the region of origin in this respect: in some countries emotional attachment to the country is less explicit, whereas in others it is very strong, and this pattern applies to all groups, including locals and immigrants. In general, people living in France, Portugal and Spain do express their emotional attachment to the country, whereas in others, such as Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, people – both locals and immigrants – are less likely to express their positive feelings about the country. We divided the European countries into three categories, based on the differences in emotional attachment to the country between immigrants and locals: in the first country group, emotional attachment to the country is significantly weaker among immigrants than among locals (Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, the UK and Norway); in the second group, immigrant background does not really make any difference to the emotional attachment to the country (Belgium, Germany, Portugal and even Spain). The third ‘group’ consists of France and the Netherlands, where TCN immigrants identify with the host country even more than the locals.

Finally, we look briefly at how immigrants and locals differ in their basic human values; this lies at the heart of acculturation. The ESS ask about the personal importance of 10 basic human values (see box below). Figure 9 shows the results, ordered in a matrix. It summarizes the differences in basic human values between the local population and immigrants, according to their region of origin. The numbers represent the share of those who say that the given value is very important to them.
Messing-Ságvári: From landing to arrival. The subtle integration of immigrants across Western Europe

**FIGURE 9. DOMINANT VALUES OF NON-IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRANTS, BY REGION OF ORIGIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic human value</th>
<th>Old member state</th>
<th>Post-communist &amp; ex-USSR</th>
<th>Middle East &amp; North Africa</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>South &amp; East Asia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Native population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulus</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note on the concept of human values and methodology**

Values are beliefs that refer to people’s desired goals. They can guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people and events. The ESS includes items that cover a set of 10 basic value orientations that are recognized in cultures around the world.

POWER: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image);

ACHIEVEMENT: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential);

HEDONISM: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgence);

STIMULATION: Excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life);

SELF-DIRECTION: Independent thought and action—choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals);

UNIVERSALISM: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment);

BENEVOLENCE: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible);

TRADITION: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self (humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, moderate);

CONFORMITY: Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honouring parents and elders);

SECURITY: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self (family security, national security, social order, reciprocation of favours).

Technically, the numbers in the cells refer to those who scored an average of at least 5.5 on a scale of 1 to 6 (where 1 = not at all like me and 6 = very much like me). The basic value scores were calculated from multiple (2–3) questionnaire items.
The main findings are as follows:

- In general, *security* as a value is very important for around a quarter of the native populations of the 13 Western European countries. Immigrants from old EU/EEA member states tend to show the same pattern; however, for all immigrant groups from other regions, security seems to be more important: around a third of them seem to regard it as very important.

- The same applies to the value *conformity*, albeit with somewhat smaller differences. About twice as many immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa as members of the native population regard conformity as important.

- *Tradition* tends to be more important for immigrants of non-European origin.

- *Benevolence and universalism* are two values that are widely shared by members of the native population; but the figures are even higher in all immigrant groups, except for immigrants from South and East Asia.

- For *self-direction*, *stimulus* and *hedonism* the differences are not significant, implying that the differences between immigrants and non-immigrants are less relevant.

- *Achievement* and *power* are the last two values: they are important (by self-declaration) for only a fraction of people, but their shares are higher in all immigrant groups.

To reiterate, in this section we have established that immigrants differ from the host societies’ local population in terms of their attitudes and sets of values. In general, they have a more positive attitude toward, and higher levels of trust in, the major societal, economic and political institutions of the country, but they feel more excluded from society than do the locals. In general, they value tradition and security but also personal achievement more than locals. Immigrants’ emotional attachment to the host country depends greatly on how the natives feel about their own country. There are significant differences in the subjective characteristics in terms of country of destination and country of origin. Institutional attitudes seem to be more dependent on where the immigrants have settled, while the perception of inclusion in the new environment seems to be more dependent on their region of origin (or visibility of migrant origin).

### 3.2 Do immigrants adapt over time to the norms of the host society?

The initial focus of our study is immigrants’ social integration through their adaptation to the attitudes and values shared by the host society. Evidently, integration does not take place as soon as immigrants arrive. In this section, we offer an analysis that paints a more dynamic picture of the lengthy process of the subtle integration, and we examine how time spent in the host country affects the adaptation and acculturation process in various country settings and for different subgroups of immigrants. Academic literature points out that integration in different spheres of life (economic, psychological, social) necessitates different amounts of time (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2011; Berry, 1997; Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2008; Masgoret and Ward, 2006; Borjas, 1985). Based on this literature, we created four groups of immigrants, according to the time elapsed since they arrived in their destination country: those who have lived in the country for less
than five years; those who have lived there for 6–10 years; those who have lived there for 10–20 years; and long-term immigrants, who have lived there for more than 20 years.

Analysing the same indicators as in the previous section, we found that time spent in the country of immigration matters a lot in terms of how people’s attitudes toward institutions change, as well as their perception of inclusion. The following chart shows the Institutional Attitude Index by the time spent in the relevant country.

**FIGURE 10. INSTITUTIONAL ATTITUDE INDEX (IAI) BY TIME SPENT IN THE COUNTRY OF DESTINATION BASE: ALL IMMIGRANTS COMING FROM NON-OLD EU MEMBER STATES**

The figure is clear about the general trend of adaptation to a host society’s attitudes and evaluation of major societal institutions. We find that immigrants in Europe have a generally more positive attitude than locals. However, this changes with the length of time spent in the given country: while recent immigrants’ IAI is 58 on average, it is 5% lower for long-term migrants (and the trend is steady), which is very close to the IAI of locals. Should we interpret this trend as one of disillusionment or loss of initial enthusiasm? Or should we view it rather as adaptation to the attitudes of the local population? While the trend is similar in all countries, its intensity is quite different: this accommodation process – i.e. loss of trust and satisfaction in institutions – is very explicit and strong in Finland, Sweden, the UK, Portugal, Ireland and France. Interestingly, the IAI of recent immigrants in German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland) is very close to that of the locals (within 5 points); thus, in these countries the changes are not as significant as elsewhere. With the exception of Finland and Norway, where the process occurs within 10 years, it usually takes over a decade to approach the level of the IAI characteristics of the host societies.

As we consider whether it is the host country or the region of origin that is more decisive in terms of the level and speed of accommodation, the following chart (Figure 11) is revealing.
When it comes to the speed and depth of accommodation to a host society’s IAI, region of origin matters far less than country of destination. With the exception of immigrants from Latin America (whose IAI does not change according to the time spent in the host country), there is a steady trend of adaptation for all immigrant groups. The largest change is observed among immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa.

If we look at the index representing the subjective perception of social exclusion – the Perceived Exclusion Index – we see a similar trend. Generally, the longer they spend in the host society, the more integrated immigrants feel on a personal level and the less origin-based discrimination they sense. The trend across countries is more diverse, though.

There are some countries where the trend in perceived exclusion is explicit and straightforward: Austria, Spain and Portugal. In several countries, immigrants who have been in the country for more than 5 years but for less than 10 years feel greater discrimination and less inclusion than those who have recently arrived or who have lived in the host country for more than 10 years. This suggests that in several countries this kind of integration takes place only after 10 years of residence (Belgium, Germany, France, UK, the
Netherlands, Sweden). Thus, in most countries it takes a relatively long time to feel integrated and not regarded as an ‘othered’ minority by the majority society.

Looking at the index from the perspective of the country of origin, it is quite obvious that immigrants who are visibly different (coloured) from the host society’s population and/or who come from a poor region are more likely not only to perceive higher levels of discrimination, but also to take longer to feel accepted than those immigrants who are of similar cultural and racial background as the majority host society: immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa feel increased levels of discrimination and rejection by the host society after 5 (or even 10) years; only those who have been living in the country for more than 20 years report higher levels of acceptance by mainstream society. While immigrants from the post-communist region, South and East Asia, and Latin America feel alienated from mainstream society in the first years following their arrival, over time their PEI declines.

The process of acculturation shows similar trends. Figure 14 on the next page shows the share of those who use the host country’s language at home, in their private lives.

In a number of countries, a majority of immigrants speak the same language (or a dialect of it) as the host country. These include primarily post-colonial countries such as Spain, Portugal and France. In the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden) and in Germany, however, only a small proportion of recent immigrants speak the host country’s language at home. This latter group of countries reveals how the length of time spent in a country changes language use: the pace of linguistic acculturation is very clear in those countries.
Another potential measure of accommodation to mainstream attitudes is how people regard the prospect of other immigrants coming and settling in the country. Figure 15 shows the share of those who are against immigrants from poorer, non-European countries coming and settling in the country. Interestingly, when we look at how attitudes toward (other) immigrants change over time, we find that after they have lived for a while in a country, immigrants become more hostile to the idea of other immigrants – even though this is an endogenous item (i.e., they have to formulate an opinion on an issue that relates directly to their own group). Generally, the longer immigrants have lived in a European country, the more negative they are toward newcomer immigrants and the closer their attitudes become to those of the local population (although they still remain more positive).

Figure 15 clearly shows a process of convergence with mainstream attitudes. In all countries, recent immigrants are very tolerant of other immigrants, and only a modest share of them say that they would not allow other immigrants to settle. Although it is the case that in all host countries immigrants become less tolerant of new immigrants the longer they spend there, nevertheless the extent of this change differs significantly in the 13 countries. The change is minor in those countries where the mainstream population is relatively open to immigrants (compared to other European countries), such as Switzerland and the Nordic countries; meanwhile immigrants’ attitudes toward newcomers change significantly in those countries that are less open (Austria, Portugal, the UK and France), as they adapt to the higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes.
In this section on how time spent in a country of destination changes attitudes, we have demonstrated some very clear trends: on all the aspects of subjective integration, the length of time spent in the destination country matters greatly in terms of how far immigrants adapt to mainstream society subjectively. On some aspects – such as the feeling of being integrated – the change may take longer and may vary by both region of origin and country of destination; but the trend is clear in all contexts and on all indices. As for the perception of being accepted (not being excluded), we see that in most destination countries this perception deteriorates in the first decade, before the feeling of being included starts to improve. In this respect, the region of origin (and whether or not the immigrant belongs to a visible minority) plays a role. Whichever measure we use, acculturation occurs over time: after a while, most immigrants start to use the language of the host country even in their private lives and adopt the attitudes of mainstream society toward recent immigrants.
3.3 How do immigrants adapt to the host country? A comparative case study of Turks, Poles and Russians as immigrants and as stayers

This section provides yet another lens through which to study the process of subtle integration. Previous sections have projected a broad image, in which all immigrants were compared to locals. However, as we mentioned above, immigrants are a highly diverse population in terms of their origins, their economic and social positions, their broader sets of values and their religion. In order to provide a more focused image, we zoom in on three groups of immigrants and compare their attitudes and values to those of their compatriots who have not migrated. For simplicity, we refer to this latter group as ‘stayers’.

We cannot establish any causal relationship between attitudes and the role of migration, because we cannot control for the effect of a person’s initial attitudes on his or her decision to migrate: can the differences between the attitudes of stayers and migrants be attributed to the latter group’s adaptation to its new social and cultural environment, or are these differences due to differences initially existing between the two groups? After all, those who decide to leave their home country behind may be more ambitious, more innovative and open minded or more desperate than those who make no such decision. Most likely, it is a combination of both elements.

Figure 16 shows the Institutional Attitude Index for three groups of stayers and migrants.

The message here is quite clear: immigrants’ institutional attitudes are closer to the European average\(^4\) than those of stayers, but the difference depends greatly on the country of origin. Of the three countries considered, Turks – both stayers and migrants – have the most positive attitude toward institutions. Russians have the least faith in institutions, whether in Russia or in Europe. However, it is the Poles who show the biggest difference: they are critical of institutions in Poland, but as immigrants they have a more positive attitude than Europeans overall.

Looking at the differences in acculturation, the attitude toward gays and lesbians provides a good example (see also Fitzgerald et al., 2014). In all three cultural settings, the predominant religion is unaccepting of

\(^4\) More specifically, the averages of the 13 European states in the focus of this paper.
homosexuality: the most intolerant environments are in Turkey and Russia; but also in Poland, a predominantly Catholic country, homosexuality is still perceived in a negative light. Figure 17 demonstrates the proportion of those who are accepting of gay and lesbian people (those who agree or strongly agree with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish).

According to the data, more than half of Russians in Russia and Turks in Turkey would not tolerate homosexuals at all. However, the majority of immigrants with a Russian (76%) or a Turkish background (69%) do accept gay and lesbian people, which means that tolerance has become the norm for those who have settled in a new and more tolerant social environment (where 92% of people are tolerant of sexual minorities). These data clearly and unambiguously show an adaptation to mainstream values. Acceptance of gays and lesbians by immigrants with a Russian, Turkish or Polish background approaches the level within the mainstream population (92%), but does not reach it. Poles become the most tolerant; however, 31% of immigrants with a Turkish background (the majority of whom are Muslim) and 24% of Russians (with a predominantly Eastern Orthodox background) still do not agree that gays and lesbians should be accepted and left to live their lives as they see fit.

The following (rather complex) chart demonstrates the differences in the set of basic human values between immigrants and stayers.
The chart reveals some noteworthy differences: the set of values of Polish immigrants differs from that of Polish stayers in the comparatively low value that immigrants attach to hedonism and enjoying life. This kind of value could get in the way of long-term planning and of forgoing present goods for the sake of the future. Turkish immigrants value power, personal achievement and stimulation more than Turkish stayers. These values are all instrumental in successful integration: those who hold those values dear consider it important to be in charge of their own lives, to do well in their profession, to show off their achievements and to be successful. They also ascribe greater importance to innovation and to trying new things. Russian immigrants value power significantly more than stayers, which means that they desire greater respect and wish to be more in charge of their lives.

All in all, this type of analysis shows a strong tendency among immigrants to adapt to the subjective traits of mainstream society. However, it is not possible to disentangle cause and effect: we do not know whether those who migrate have a value set and norms that are already closer to those of mainstream European society, or whether this difference between stayers and immigrants can be understood as a consequence of migration and of settling in a new social environment with different norms, attitudes and values. Most likely it is a combination of the two.

3.4 Comparative analysis of the integration of first- and second-generation immigrants

A number of studies and publications discuss the differences between various generations of immigrants, as well as their adaptation and acculturation. These studies deal mainly with structural elements of integration (such as integration into the labour market, entrepreneurship, education and language) and with personal experiences of integration, including a significant emphasis on issues of ethnic identity and culture. This literature has become even more important in the light of recent radicalization among certain groups of second-generation immigrants. In this study, we aim to offer a broad, cross-country comparison of first- and second-generation TCN immigrants (with reference to the differences in the main indicators used earlier in the study) and to show that – although in some countries and among some groups of immigrants there may be a retreat from integration – by and large we see a consistent process, by which the values and attitudes of second-generation immigrants (individuals born in the country of residence, but both of whose parents were born abroad) converge with those of the local population with no immigrant background.

Figure 19 shows the differences in the Institutional Attitude Index between first- and second-generation immigrants, as compared to natives. A positive value indicates a higher level of IAI (i.e. greater satisfaction with, and trust in, institutions) among immigrants than among locals.
The data show that, in most of the countries, the trend (shown in section 3.2) of immigrants adapting more to the attitudes of natives the longer they spend in the host country continues with the second generation of immigrants: their satisfaction with, and trust in, institutions become similar to the attitudes of non-immigrants, which also implies some disillusionment and change in expectations. There are, however, significant differences between countries in this respect, too. In all countries, the difference in IAI is much larger in the first generation than in the second (Spain could be something of an exception). However, in Spain, Ireland and Germany, the difference in IAI remains significant in the second generation, meaning that even those who were born and raised in the host country are more trusting in, and better satisfied with, institutions than are the native Spanish, Irish or Germans.

If we look at the Perceived Exclusion Index and compare the perceptions of first- and of second-generation immigrants to those of natives, then the picture is rather telling.

Again, the first generation perceives higher levels of exclusion; but even those who were born and bred in the given country feel significantly more excluded than natives. In many countries, the difference in the PEI between second generation and natives remains at above 10% (Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal). With one exception (Austria), these are traditional destination countries with a colonial past, and consequently have a significant population of second- (and third+) generation immigrants. For Austria, the relatively high PEI among second-generation immigrants may be explained by
the fact that, of all the countries examined, it has the highest level of PEI among first-generation immigrants (Figure 6 in section 3.1). Immigrants feel personally most included in countries where the majority population is most open and accepting, such as Switzerland, Norway and Sweden (Messing and Ságvári, 2018). There are a few important outliers, such as the UK and the Netherlands, where there is almost no difference between the first and the second generation in terms of how included they feel. This is somewhat alarming: if many of those who are born in a country and identify with it feel excluded and discriminated against on a personal level, because of their origins, that could lead to disillusionment, identity crisis and even radicalization.

Looking at the process of acculturation, the following chart demonstrates a similar adaptation process. Use of the host country’s language in private (at home) is obviously more frequent among second-generation immigrants in all countries (Figure 21). Apart from in Norway and Austria (!), less than a quarter of second-generation immigrants speak the language of their parents at home. There are countries where the change in the primary language is almost complete by the second generation (Portugal, Ireland), while in others many immigrants keep the language of their forebears (Austria, Norway).

We believe this is partly to do with the desire to fit into the local society, but the role of the education system – and how it approaches immigrants’ education and their right to use the language of origin – is also significant. European countries generally expect immigrants to learn the local language and to pursue their studies in that language. Among first-generation immigrants we see how important language-learning policies and support are: in Germany, where most immigrants come from non-German-speaking countries, the proportion of first-generation immigrants who speak the host country’s language at home is the same as in the UK or Ireland, where a large share of immigrants come from countries where English is the official language (or is at least widely spoken). In the case of second-generation immigrants, however, we see educational policies that support immigrants and minorities in maintaining the language and culture of their origins. When considering policy data, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is the best source. It shows that education policies may indeed have an impact on the acculturation of immigrants: Portugal.
Sweden, Belgium and Norway perform best on MIPEX, and we see that – with the exception of Norway – those are the countries where acculturation in terms of language use is the most explicit.

To sum up this section: it is evident that the subjective integration of immigrants continues beyond the first generation and – with a few exceptions – takes place almost fully. Still, in many countries, around a tenth of second-generation immigrants – especially among those who are visibly different from the locals – feel discriminated against on the basis of their origins. This is especially alarming in the Netherlands, where the perception of social exclusion is not only high, but also remains virtually unchanged into the second generation. Acculturation – measured through the extent to which the local language is embraced – is a slow but steady process, encouraged by a perceived need to adapt to the mainstream culture, and by the institutional support mechanisms offered by the educational systems.

3.5 Determinants of integration: a multivariate model

The results so far have provided insights into the factors that explain the convergence of institutional attitudes, perceived integration and acculturation. Based on the logic of our analysis, the results have so far been presented in one dimension at a time: either country of origin, or country of destination, or time spent in the host country. In this section, we take a step further and show our findings from a more complex multivariate model that tries to incorporate multiple dimensions and to demonstrate their relationship to each other in explaining the process of subtle integration.

The following model uses the Perceived Exclusion Index as a dependent variable (one to be explained) and includes several other explanatory (predictor) variables. The aim of the model is to find those factors that increase (or decrease) the likelihood of someone feeling discriminated against on the basis of personal characteristics that can be directly linked to their immigrant origins (i.e. race or colour, language, nationality, religion, ethnicity).

The model applies to all first-generation migrants whose country of origin lies outside the current boundaries of the European Union and EEA (including Switzerland).

The initial set of explanatory variables was as follows:

- region of origin (post-communist & ex-USSR, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia, South & Latin America)
- country of destination
- Muslim religion (categories: 1. yes or 2. no)
- time spent in the country of destination (categories: 1. less than 5 years or 2. more than 5 years)
- level of education (categories: 1. low, 2. mid or 3. high)
- age group (categories: 1. under 29 years, 2. 30–49 years, 3. 50 or over)
- labour market status (categories: 1. paid work, 2. education, 3. unemployed, 4. retired, 5. other inactive)

The final model included only those explanatory variables that appear above in *italics*. Only those were kept that had at least one category with a significant effect on the dependent variable.
We used binary logistic regression to explain the value of the Perceived Exclusion Index – such as whether or not somebody felt discriminated against on the basis of certain characteristics. In general, this method is used to predict which of two categories a person is likely to belong to, given certain scores on the explanatory variables. The model is interpreted by odds ratios: these help us to evaluate the impact of each predictor. The odds ratio always represents a proportionate change in odds, compared to a reference category. If the value is greater than 1, then it indicates that, for the given value of the predictor, the odds are greater of the outcome occurring. In our case, the outcome is when somebody claims that he/she feels discriminated against. Personal characteristics with odds ratios greater than 1 increase the likelihood of sensing discrimination, while values below 1 tend to decrease it (e.g. the value of 1.35 for immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, which means that those people are 1.35 times more likely to feel discriminated against than immigrants who come from post-communist or ex-USSR countries – as the reference category). In Figure 22 below, the reference category for each predictor is marked with an asterisk (*), and significant predictors are depicted in blue, while non-significant predictors are shown in grey. This means that, statistically speaking, only those categories in blue ‘count’ in the model, and only they have a strong impact on whether or not somebody will feel discriminated against.

The results of the model show that, first of all, the region of origin seems to differentiate to a great extent between groups of immigrants. Here, the reference category is immigrants from post-communist and ex-USSR countries. In previous sections we demonstrated that immigrants from this region are most similar to the native populations in terms of their attitudes and values. The results show that immigrants from South and East Asia, from the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and from Latin America have a greater chance of feeling discriminated against on the basis of their origins. The odds are highest for people from the Sub-Saharan African countries (1.83), but they are also significantly positive for immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa (1.35) and Latin America (1.39).

Concerning religion, being Muslim is one of the most important predictors of exclusion. In general, Muslims are twice as likely (2.03) to feel discriminated against as are non-Muslims. Also, having spent less than five years in the host country increases the likelihood of a feeling of discrimination by 1.26, suggesting that in general, it takes some considerable time to feel a sense of inclusion.

Somebody who is unemployed has greater odds (1.4) of feeling discriminated against than someone who is working. By contrast, retirement affects discrimination in a positive way (0.55) – i.e. it significantly reduces the odds of feeling discriminated against. This all implies that integration occurs through the labour market.

Finally, individual country effects are somewhat ambiguous. After controlling for all other variables, the host country itself does not have a strong influence on the level of integration. (The reference category for countries as predictors is Sweden.) The only exceptions to this are Austria and Belgium. For the former, there is a large positive country effect – i.e. residing in Austria increases the likelihood of perceived exclusion. For the latter, the relationship is reversed – i.e. on its own, the effect of being an immigrant in Belgium reduces the odds of feeling discriminated against by half. However, the fact that the odds ratios for all other countries are not significant suggests that it is not primarily countries that are responsible for differences in perceived social exclusion, but rather it is the result of a more complex web of individual, group- and country-specific characteristics.
FIGURE 22. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL

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<td></td>
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<td>2.03</td>
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4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Overall, we found a very explicit and remarkable adaptation of immigrants to the values, norms and attitudes of whichever mainstream society they live in. All of the indicators of subtle integration that were applied show that, although they differ somewhat in their attitudes and values from the local population, nevertheless they are closer in this respect to their host country’s population than to the population in their country of origin. Concerning values, attitudes and norms, they are in-betweeners – slowly approaching the population of the host country, while moving away from the cultural norms and attitudes that characterize the population of the country where they were born.

In general, immigrants have a more positive attitude and a higher level of trust in the major societal, economic and political institutions of the country where they reside than native-born residents, but feel more excluded from society. Also, in general, they set greater store by tradition and security, and also find personal achievement more important. Thus, immigrants are more conservative in terms of traditions and religion than is the general population of Western Europe. They also attach greater significance to values that support success and independence (such as competition, striving, self-direction and achievement).

There are significant differences in the subjective characteristics of immigrants, depending on country of destination and country of origin. Attitude toward institutions seems to be more dependent on where immigrants have settled, whereas the perception of inclusion in the new environment seems to hinge more on region of origin (or visibility of migrant origin).

In terms of acculturation – that is, the process by which individuals moving from one cultural context to another develop new patterns of behaviour and identity, shaped by the dominant norms of the new cultural context – the language used in private (at home) and emotional attachment to the country were examined. We have shown that both adaptation to the host country’s language and the extent to which immigrants feel emotionally attached to their host country vary greatly across countries. The former depends on whether the host country’s language is spoken in the region of origin and on migrant integration policies in the host country, while the latter seems to be more dependent on how emotionally attached natives feel to the country (the shared/accepted level of nationalism).

Analysing numerous aspects of the subtle integration of immigrants in Western European societies, we found a very clear and unequivocal trend of convergence of immigrants’ attitudes and values with those of the mainstream host societies. This convergence takes place in all immigrant groups and in all destination countries for all aspects of the analysis: attitude toward institutions, perception of integration and acculturation. However, subtle integration requires time – sometimes a really long time in the context of a human life. The speed of convergence is not the same in all destination countries, and it seems that migrants of colour who arrive from poorer regions take significantly longer to adapt to the host country’s environment. Convergence with the host society continues beyond the first generation: the values and attitudes of second-generation migrants are very similar to those of natives in the host society – but in some countries, and for some origin groups, they do remain different.
FIGURE 23. SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE MAIN INDICATORS

INSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION INDEX (IAI)
Difference between locals and TCN immigrants (in points)

PERCEIVED EXCLUSION INDEX (PEI)
Difference between locals and TCN immigrants (in points)

USE OF LANGUAGE
Percentage of TCN immigrants using the language of the host country

EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT
Difference between locals and TCN immigrants (in points)
Perhaps the most important takeaway from the analysis is that a well-functioning institutional setting is a prerequisite, as well as a safeguard, allowing immigrants to integrate not only in objective terms, but also in their attitudes and values.

Although the existence of well-functioning institutions that offer access to high-quality public services to all those eligible has to be seen as the most efficient tool for the integration of immigrants, the language of the host country, the general attitude toward immigrants of the host population and the origins of the immigrants themselves all have very important roles to play in terms of both the depth of immigrants’ subjective integration and how long it takes. Those who arrive from poor countries outside Europe – especially if they have visible (either racial or cultural) traits – have a more difficult task integrating into mainstream society. These groups require special attention and more support than non-visible immigrants arriving from wealthier parts of the world.

If we look more broadly at how different countries are performing in terms of immigrants’ subjective integration, it is hard to pinpoint any countries that are doing particularly well or particularly badly. However, Germany – which has a large and diverse immigrant population – is not only performing relatively well on most of the indicators of immigrants’ subjective integration, but also provides an example of a country where the process of adaptation is very explicit and significant, and where this process continues beyond the first generation. The acquisition of language plays an unequivocally important role, as does a generally welcoming environment and strong institutional support for immigrants’ social integration. Austria may be seen as the antithesis of this: immigrants in Austria rank low on all indicators of subjective integration. However, the picture is more rosy if we consider the length of time spent in the country and how the adaptation process continues in the second generation: leaving aside the language use of the second generation, all the indicators show an unequivocal trend toward adaptation. The Netherlands is a rather puzzling case: while immigrants do relatively well on all the indicators of subjective integration, the duration of time spent in the country appears to have little effect. It is somewhat alarming that even second-generation immigrants feel a relatively high level of exclusion in the Netherlands.
5 REFERENCES


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Acknowledgements: the authors of this report would like to express their gratitude to colleagues at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Budapest, especially to Csilla Malomvölgyi and Zsolt Bogár for the invaluable support throughout this project. We would like to thank András Kováts, Attila Melegh for their insightful comments and Clive Liddiard for his thorough language edits.

7 IMPRINT

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Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional project “Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe”
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Responsible: Beate Martin
Cover photo: ID 17177102 © Hxdbxy | Dreamstime.com

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ISBN 978-615-81517-4-0